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Abstract Integrated water resources management
(IWRM) assumes coherence between cognate aspects of
water governance at the river basin scale, for example
water quality, energy production and agriculture objec-
tives. But critics argue that IWRM is often less ‘integrated’
in practice, raising concerns over inter-sectoral coherence
between implementing institutions. One increasingly sig-
nificant aspect of IWRM is adaptation to climate change-
related risks, including threats from flooding, which are
particularly salient in England. Although multiple institu-
tional mechanisms exist for flood risk management (FRM),
their coherence remains a critical question for national
adaptation. This paper therefore (1) maps the multi-level
institutional frameworks determining both IWRM and
FRM in England; (2) examines their interaction via various
inter-institutional coordinating mechanisms; and (3)
assesses the degree of coherence. The analysis suggests
that cognate EU strategic objectives for flood risk assess-
ment demonstrate relatively high vertical and horizontal
coherence with river basin planning. However, there is less
coherence with flood risk requirements for land-use plan-
ning and national flood protection objectives. Overall, this
complex governance arrangement actually demonstrates
de-coherence over time due to ongoing institutional frag-
mentation. Recommendations for increasing IWRM
coherence in England or re-coherence based on greater
spatial planning and coordination of water-use and land-
use strategies are proposed.
Keywords Integrated water resources management
(IWRM)  Flood risk  Institutional fragmentation  Climate
change  Adaptation  River basin management planning
Introduction
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) has
acquired paradigmatic status as a key governance approach
for the sustainable development of water resources globally
(Gain et al. 2013; Rouillard et al. 2014; Benson et al.
2015). Although forms of regional-scale integrated water
management date back decades, if not centuries (Molle
2009), in the 1990s the IWRM approach emerged in
national policy discourses becoming widely advocated by
international organisations such as the European Union and
United Nations, and global development organisations.
While conceptions differ, several underlying principles are
inherent to IWRM in terms of institutional framing, scales
of management interaction, public participation, economic
valuation of resources and, critically, the effective ‘inte-
gration’ or coherence between cognate policy aspects of
water governance at the river basin level—for example,
related higher-level demands for water quality, climate
adaptation, energy production and agriculture (GWP 2010;
Gain et al. 2013). Supporters of IWRM maintain that
coherence is essential to effective management due to the
interrelated nature of these environmental components,
with examples drawn from different countries (e.g. Smith
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et al. 2015). But while questions have been consistently
raised over just how ‘integrated’ IWRM actually is (see
Rouillard et al. 2014), the degree to which (in)coherence is
evident remains underexplored in the environmental gov-
ernance literature. Such incoherence is visible in both
developed and developing countries (ibid.), potentially
providing a significant research agenda for mutual learning
and ‘lesson-drawing’ (Benson and Jordan 2011). This
paper therefore examines and assesses the coherence
between IWRM, flood risk management (FRM) and land-
use planning in England by analysing the institutional
coordinating mechanisms that they interact with.
In England, the degree to which integrated water
management, in the form of the EU Water Framework
Directive (WFD), actually provides coherence with a
‘nexus’ of cognate policy sectors through river basin
planning, particularly agriculture, remains questionable
(Fritsch and Benson 2013; Benson et al. 2015). Indeed,
one area of potential incoherence is the degree to which
WFD objectives are coordinated with parallel demands for
climate change adaptation. The Directive already man-
dates adaptation in the management of water resources,
primarily with regard to water quality and abstraction, but
an increasingly important aspect in the context of climate
change in Europe is flood risk management. The EU
Floods Directive 2007, which compels Member States to
assess flood risks and integrate them with river basin
planning, is one policy driver. Moreover, in England,
where climate projections indicate increased flood risks
from sea-level rise and more severe storm events (Defra
2012), several national policy initiatives have been
adopted in recent years (Lorenzoni et al. 2016). A critical
question for IWRM and national climate adaptation in
England therefore is the extent to which river basin
planning successfully coheres with these policy
requirements.
Policy coherence, as opposed to parallel strategic-level
governance terms such as policy coordination and ‘main-
streaming’, remains somewhat underexplored, ‘with little
research undertaken on the concept, what it means and how
it can be assessed’ (Nilsson et al. 2012: 396). According to
May et al. (2006: 382), ‘coherence implies that various
policies go together because they share a set of ideas or
objectives’. But as we explain, this view of coherence
raises questions over how such a concept can be measured
and the intervening factors shaping it in practice. One
aspect that we focus on in this paper is institutions and the
degree of fragmentation between them (see May et al.
2005, 2006) as an intervening factor in understanding the
coherence between IWRM and climate change adaptation
policy in the form of flood risk management. An institu-
tional perspective, rather than the focus on policy making
typical of coordination or mainstreaming studies, allows
greater examination of how policies function or cohere
together in practice.
This paper therefore reviews the existing literature on
policy coherence to develop an analytical framework. Four
main institutional indicators are employed, namely objec-
tives, instruments, implementation and outputs (based on
the examination of relevant literature, as outlined in the
sections below). These are utilised to examine policy
coherence between the WFD and climate adaptation in
England, from an institutional perspective, also drawing
upon an historical context to current flood risk management
and its key institutional characteristics. In terms of envi-
ronmental governance, England remains distinct from other
UK national contexts such as Scotland and provides a good
empirical ‘test bed’ to examine coherence, given its long
history of regional scale, integrated forms of water man-
agement (Cook 2016; Benson et al. 2013). The analysis
shows a complex institutional architecture of regulations,
strategies, plans and coordinating mechanisms at multiple
levels, including the local. In the final section of this paper,
their degree of coherence is assessed and discussed.
Although coastal matters are mentioned throughout this
paper, as they are covered by IWRM and FRM in England,
they are not considered in detail.
Defining and assessing policy coherence
Policy coherence is a contested concept, with multiple
interpretations evident in the governance literature on not
only its meaning but also, importantly, its measurement.
Thomas (2012: 458), for example, notes how even within
the narrow confines of EU foreign policy studies, there is
considerable disagreement ‘on how to define and measure
the concept’. As discussed above, for May et al. (2006:
382), policies should, normatively, cohere where they
contain related objectives and ideas. This basic definition
reflects Rhodes’ (1997: 222) argument that coherence
involves the production of ‘logically and consistently
related policies’. As incoherence can lead to ‘implemen-
tation gaps’ (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983), normative
demands for greater coordination between policy actors to
ensure more consistent implementation have come to
underpin normative notions of ‘network’ or ‘joined-up’
governance (Jordan and Schout 2006; Bevir 2009). A
bewildering variety of strategic mechanisms, tools and
techniques has consequently been introduced for higher-
level coordination, ‘mainstreaming’ or integration of par-
allel objectives within policy formulation, particularly in
sustainable development governance, including interna-
tional policy regimes (OECD 2002; Jordan and Lenschow
2010; Jordan et al. 2015). But problematically, coherent
policies need to integrate common ideological precepts or
D. Benson, I. Lorenzoni
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objectives throughout their life cycles (following May
et al.’s 2006 perspective), indicating that ‘coherence’
should include a much broader consideration of post-de-
cisional implementation and impacts in practice (see
Nilsson et al. 2012). In this sense, coherence should then
also entail vertical and horizontal policy interaction
between multiple institutional levels throughout these
interlinked stages (Nilsson et al. 2012). Hence, Vela´quez
Gomar et al. (2014: 121) understand coherence in inter-
national regimes as a ‘complementarity of action (mutual
reinforcement)’, evident across the policy cycle, in terms of
process, outputs and outcomes, at international and
national scales. In their view, ‘coherent governance’ should
provide holistic linkage between these elements (ibid.).
Yet, while it remains relatively straightforward to measure
consistency between higher-level policy ideas or objec-
tives, simply by examining (mis)matches between them in
policy outputs, the broader definition of multi-level
coherence raises practical questions over empirical mea-
surement of mutual reinforcement throughout the cycle at
different levels.
Several approaches to measuring coherence are evident
in the governance literature, but they tend to map on to the
conventional policy cycle. For public policy analysts,
policy processes can be conceptualised as an adaptive cycle
involving agenda-setting, formulation, adoption, imple-
mentation, evaluation and succession (e.g. Dunn 2004; Hill
2013). Some scholars more narrowly focus on ‘upstream’
policy coherence in the formulation stage, for example
May et al. (2006) who examine correlation between policy
issues, interests and the social targeting of measures for a
number of US legislative measures. Others have sought to
examine post-decisional aspects as well. Vela´quez Gomar
et al. (2014: 121) examine ‘upstream policy processes…
the coherency of national policies and implementation
arrangements (policy outputs), and the cohesiveness and
effectiveness of governance as a whole (outcomes and
impacts)’. Nilsson et al. (2012) also employ a multi-level,
objectives-led approach to evaluating coherence in EU
environmental policy sectors. They also argue that coher-
ence should be examined through the cross-policy interplay
between higher-level objectives setting and instrumenta-
tion, and its effects on implementation and outputs at the
national level. They apply this framework to environmental
policy areas to examine their coherence, including the
degree of alignment between the WFD and EU renewable
energy objectives, suggesting that this type of framework
may constitute a potentially ideal approach for studying
IWRM.
By combining these arguments, from Nilsson et al.
(2012) and May et al. (2006) and the authors’ experience of
UK water management, we can construct an analytical
framework for measuring the degree of (in)coherence
between adjacent IWRM policies through their vertical and
horizontal institutional interplay (Table 1). Focusing
specifically on multi-level institutional fragmentation (May
et al. 2006) through time and space allows a sharper
empirical focus than that provided by the Nilsson et al.’s
framework. Rule-based and organisational institutions are
common empirical foci in environmental governance
research, particularly water management (Ostrom 2005;
Young 2002). Indeed, various scholars have identified
institutional design of IWRM as critical to effective ‘wa-
tershed’ or catchment management (Sabatier et al. 2005;
Benson et al. 2013). In considering the coherence of
strategic-level IWRM policy objectives, we can therefore
examine their institutional embedding in policy. Here,
drawing on Nilsson et al., coherence could be understood
to be high where policy objectives are fully aligned in
institutions (i.e. these objectives should not be contradic-
tory or mutually exclusive), whereas incoherence would be
associated with non-alignment. IWRM policy instruments
(e.g. regulations) would also exhibit compatibility in such
institutional frameworks where coherence in their calibra-
tion is high. With regard to IWRM implementation, high
coherence would equate with coordination between
implementing institutions at different scales, including
regional (e.g. among designated management plans).
Finally, Nilsson et al. (2012) refer to converging outcomes.
However, these are often difficult to determine in adaptive
water management processes such as river basin planning
or watershed management due to the long run nature of
planning cycles (see Sabatier et al. 2005; Benson et al.
2014). Therefore, we employ institutional outputs (ibid.) as
a proxy for outcomes. For example, IWRM management
measures can be considered an output, since these should
positively determine outcomes. When assessing coherence
in EU water policy, a critical institutional indicator of
IWRM coherence would therefore be the degree of vertical
and horizontal consistency between higher-level EU
objectives, national instrumentation and regional or lower
(catchment)-level implementation, and their implications
for institutional outputs. Within the WFD, the key institu-
tional output of river basin management would be plan-
derived management measures.
Methods
The methods employed combined qualitative analysis of
key documents with interview data to test the framework.
Official documents were collected to initially map the
multi-level institutional framework determining IWRM,
FRM and land-use planning in England. Main documents
employed included a national survey of Local Flood Risk
Management Strategies, draft Flood Risk Management
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Plans, River Basin Management Plans and national flood
and planning policy. This national context was chosen as a
wider proxy for UK practice, although it should be noted
that Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have adopted
slightly different approaches to water management within
overarching EU policy. These documents were then
employed, in conjunction with elite interviews with policy
actors (Environment Agency, local government), to deter-
mine the degree of interaction between four different
institutional ‘pillars’, as discussed below. This interaction
was then assessed using the analytical framework (outlined
in Table 1) to examine coherence.
River basin and flood risk management in England
Historical context
Modern flood risk management in England can be histor-
ically related to integrated river basin or catchment-based
forms of water management as far back as the early
twentieth century (Lorenzoni et al. 2016). Most flood
management in Britain before this era had been conducted
at local scales by a plethora of private and public actors
(Cook 2016). However, between the 1930s and the 1980s,
there was a discernible shift from fragmentation and
localism towards more holistic, regional approaches that
combined flood management with qualitative aspects of
water management. Initially, the Land Drainage Act 1930
created drainage districts and catchment boards to provide
flood defence and land drainage in certain areas (Cook
2016). These bodies were followed by the establishment of
Internal Drainage Boards (IDBs), while catchment boards
were replaced by regional River Boards in 1952. Further
integration occurred in 1963, with the concentration of
River Boards into 27 regional River Authorities which
were given responsibility for most water tasks. In 1973, ten
Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) were then established
to manage major aspects of water management, including
flood defences, at river basin scales. During the late 1970s
and early 1980s, flood defence became dominated by large
central government-funded land drainage schemes, with
flood management mainly conducted in respect of farming
and landowning interests (see Penning-Rowsell et al.
1986).
Institutional fragmentation of this relatively integrated
approach started in the late 1980s. Ideological shifts in
central government under the Thatcher administration
meant that expenditure on land drainage was reduced,
with resources shifted towards urban and coastal flood
defences. Regional Water Authorities in England and
Wales became privatised water and sewage service pro-
viders, and they lost regulatory functions to the National
Rivers Authority (NRA). More significant governance
changes occurred in 1995 with the creation of the national
Environment Agency (EA). This organisation was given
widespread regulatory powers along with supervisory
responsibilities for main flood defences, both on land and
along the coast. Regional Flood Defence Committees
(RDFCs) were formed by the EA to coordinate operations
across the country (Lorenzoni et al. 2016). Comprised of
EA representatives and local authorities, the Committees
had executive powers over flood risk management and
maintenance activities of the EA (ibid.). While grant-in-
aid funds were provided by central government to support
this work, RDFCs could also impose local levies to sup-
port flood defence projects not meeting national funding
priorities. In addition, they could delegate decisions to
Local Flood Drainage Committees, comprised mainly of
local council appointees. Locally elected IDBs still con-
tinued to operate, playing an important role in flood risk
management through their control over water tables.
Local authorities also possessed flood defence powers to
maintain smaller watercourses and the right to enter pri-
vate lands to conduct essential drainage work. Therefore,
by the late 1990s and early 2000s, an institutionally
fragmented architecture of flood risk management was
evolving, based on central EA control of major flood
defences, local authority powers and non-governmental
actor responsibilities.
Table 1 Analytical framework applied in this study, outlining features of IWRM policy (in)coherence in relation to vertical and horizontal
aspects, derived from Nilsson et al. (2012), May et al. (2006), Benson et al. (2014). For terminological indications, see text above
High coherence Partial coherence Incoherence
Objectives Objectives and targets fully aligned Objectives and targets partially aligned No objectives and targets aligned
Instruments Instruments fully compatible Instruments partially compatible Instruments incompatible
Implementation Full coordination in implementing
institutions
Limited coordination in implementing
institutions
No coordination in implementing
institutions
Outputs Full consistency in
planning/management measures
Partial consistency in
planning/management measures
No consistency in
planning/management measures
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At this point, government policy partly shifted from
flood defence provision to a more pre-emptive, risk-based
management role based on spatial (land use) planning
(Porter and Demeritt 2012). As Penning-Rowsell and
Handmer (1988) show, flood management in England has
been characterised by an uneasy tension between local
government land-use planning discretion, within the con-
text of national planning policy guidance, and the need for
flood defence of properties. National government circu-
lars, in 1947, 1962 and 1969, had progressively sought to
encourage greater cooperation between the two objectives,
particularly in preventing development on floodplains
(ibid.). Water authorities at this time, however, were only
given an advisory role meaning that flood risks were
sometimes overlooked in planning decisions. The UK
Government, in response, introduced Planning Policy
Guidance Note (PPGN) 25 in 2000 (now Planning Policy
Statement or PPS 25), which created a statutory consul-
tation role for the Environment Agency in such develop-
ments. Local planning authorities then were required to
produce risk-based assessments of development plans and
decisions. The EA could ‘call-in’ decisions where it sus-
pected that its recommendations were not followed. As a
planning decision-support tool, the EA produced flood
risk maps for local authorities to employ showing areas
most at risk of inundation. Catchment Flood Management
Plans, covering river flood risks in priority catchments,
were also developed by the EA to provide long-term
strategic management objectives. Shoreline Management
Plans (SMPs) that provide assessments of coastal erosion
and flood risks were produced in parallel via consultation
between the EA, marine district authorities and other
relevant bodies.
The underlying ideology of national flood risk man-
agement began to shift again in the mid-2000s. Traditional
hard engineering responses were modified to allow for
greater sustainable development predicated on ‘making
space for water’ (Johnson and Priest 2008). Based on an
enhanced decision-making role for non-state actors, co-
funding and more holistic approaches to flood control
planning, this approach came under significant scrutiny in
2007 (discussed further below). ‘Europeanization’ of UK
water policy also continued during this period with the
adoption of the European Union (EU) Floods Directive
2007 (Lorenzoni et al. 2016). The Directive requires
Member States to harmonise flood risk management
approaches by conducting Preliminary Flood Risk
Assessments, producing maps showing flood risks and
producing national plans for managing flood risks. In
response, the EA has since produced flood maps on a
national basis showing areas potentially at risk from river,
sea or reservoir flooding.
In England, these governance structures came under
severe pressure during the floods of 2000–2001 and then in
2007 when widespread flooding was particularly destruc-
tive in the north-east and central England in June, and in
southern areas during July. Responding to criticisms of its
flood risk management policy, the Government initiated a
review conducted by Sir Michael Pitt. His report (known as
the Pitt Review) was damning of existing flood manage-
ment and made several recommendations for change
(Cabinet Office 2008). Most notably, he identified the need
for adequate resourcing of flood resilience measures and
pre-planned emergency funding for exceptional events.
Recommendations were also made for increasing flood risk
information to the public via maps (EA 2013), along with
an enhanced role for local authorities and the public in
managing flood defences. Pitt suggested that these mea-
sures should be coordinated through a national action plan
to provide oversight.
The UK Government ministry responsible for flood
matters, Defra1 (the Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs), responded to the Pitt Review by sup-
porting all of the 92 recommendations (Defra 2008). In
particular, it pledged new responsibilities for the EA in the
strategic management of flood risks, more and better
modelling of flood risk and greater cooperation between
the national-level and local authorities ‘to support them in
taking on a local leadership role, including responsibility
for local flood risk management including surface water
risk’ (ibid.: 5). Additional funds were pledged by Defra for
helping local authorities perform these roles.
The government adopted the Flood and Water Man-
agement Act 2010 to implement its response to the Pitt
Review. Among the main changes contained in the Act
were providing lead powers to upper-tier local authorities
(county council, unitary authorities) for local flood risk
management, flood investments and cooperation with the
EA and other stakeholders such as district councils, IDBs
and water companies. As a result of this commitment, there
has been further institutional fragmentation of floods gov-
ernance. The Environment Agency still retained overall
responsibility for coordinating flood risk management
nationally. This system was supported by a new institu-
tional governance structure for flood and coastal erosion
risk management (FCERM). Subsequent national policy
became framed by the National Flood and Coastal Erosion
Risk Management Strategy (2011), with Defra designated
as the lead government ministry and the EA the imple-
menting agent. As a result, the EA is now directly
responsible for managing around 70 % of flood defences in
1 Defra is the lead Government department for national flood
management policy, which determines the actions of the main
implementing agents such as the Environment Agency.
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England: primarily concerning flood risks from major riv-
ers, coastal inundation and reservoirs (Bennett 2014: 8).2
The remaining ‘third-party assets’ are overseen by IBDs,
local authorities and private actors (ibid.). Critical coordi-
nating mechanisms between these different actors are the
Regional Flood and Coastal Committees (RFCCs) that
replaced the RDFCs in 2011 (Lorenzoni et al. 2016). These
Committees are comprised of Lead Local Flood Authori-
ties (LLFAs—county councils and unitary authorities) and
expert appointees, who work with the EA in determining
flood defence spending for specific projects on a regional
scale (ibid.).
Mapping the current governance landscape
Given this long historical development and ongoing insti-
tutional fragmentation, the current relationship between
river basin management and flood risk management in
England is highly complex. In mapping this complexity,
we can refer to four main institutional ‘pillars’ or policy
strands: the Water Framework Directive; the Floods
Directive; national FCERM policy; and land-use planning
(Fig. 1). These institutional mechanisms are linked by
coordinating mechanisms, discussed in more detail below.
Firstly, the Water Framework Directive is the main
mechanism for implementing IWRM in the European
Union. By the mid-1990s, the perceived inability of some
‘first-generation’ water policies, introduced by the EEC in
the 1970s, to address non-point source pollution problems
led to demands for more holistic approaches (Benson and
Jordan 2008). As a result, the European Commission
developed proposals for the Water Framework Directive,
adopted in 2000. Based upon IWRM principles (see Gain
et al. 2013), the Directive mandates the creation of River
Basin Districts (RBDs) across the EU, some spanning
national borders. Within each river basin, Member States
are compelled to undertake river basin management plan-
ning. Designated implementing authorities must develop a
plan, in conjunction with public participation, comprised of
a Programme of Measures (POMs) aimed at achieving the
‘good ecological status’ of surface (and ‘good chemical
status’ of ground) waters within each river basin, including
coastal waters. The second phase of planning finished in
2015, with subsequent future plan revisions adopted on a
six-year cycle thereafter. Implementation in England has
now met the requirements of the Directive, although to date
the impact on water quality has been limited (Benson et al.
2014).
While aimed primarily at improving water quality, the
Directive also integrates climate adaptation. Member
States were recommended to include adaptation measures
in the first planning phase. Some measures—mainly related
to water quality and abstraction—were therefore included
in many national planning approaches prior to 2009, but
research in EU states suggests that these have been limited
in practice (Brouwer et al. 2013). Indeed, in England, all
the RBD plans produced by the Environment Agency make
reference to adaptation measures; yet, these almost exclu-
sively seek to support water quality objectives and manage
abstraction activities under predicted future conditions of
climate change. Integration of planning with other climate-
related flood risks is, however, anticipated under the Floods
Directive (2007/60/EC).
Secondly, adopted in 2007 in response to devastating
floods in central Europe, the Floods Directive aims ‘to
reduce and manage the risks that floods pose to human
health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic
activity’ (European Commission 2015). In meeting this
aim, Member States were compelled, by 2011, to conduct
preliminary flood risk assessments to determine which river
basins and coastal zones are vulnerable. These areas, once
identified, then were required to be incorporated into flood
risk maps by 2013, which would inform flood risk man-
agement plans by 2015. Implementation of the Floods
Directive is designed to coordinate with the Water
Framework Directive in terms of the production of flood
risk management plans and river basin management plans,
planning timescales and the participation of public actors in
this process.
Requirements of the Floods Directive are implemented
by the UK national Flood Risk Regulations 2009 (Statutory
Instrument 2009/3042). Under the Regulations, Risk
Management Authorities (RMAs), comprised of multiple
actors, work together collaboratively to manage flood risk.
Lead Local Flood Authorities (LLFAs) (unitary or county
councils) prepared preliminary assessment reports of
flooding risks in their jurisdictions which were reviewed by
the Environment Agency (EA). After the EA’s review, a
preliminary assessment map was produced for each river
basin based on information provided by the EA and other
sources. A preliminary assessment report was then pro-
duced by the LLFA. The Environment Agency then iden-
tified flood risk areas within each river basin district, with
LLFAs obliged to state whether they were significant.
Preliminary assessment maps and reports were then pub-
lished for each river basin district in 2011. Both LLFAs and
the Environment Agency then reviewed these documents,
prior to preparing flood hazard maps and flood risk maps,
which must be consistent with river basin management
2 The Environment Agency in England operates on an area structure
since April 2014 (totalling 16 geographical areas). The Environment
Agency Wales operated until April 2013 as a Welsh Government-
sponsored body; it then merged with Countryside Council for Wales
and Forestry Commission Wales to become a single environmental
body, Natural Resources Wales.
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plans. Published by the EA in 2013, the maps were then
reviewed by both actors. Finally, there is a requirement on
both parties to prepare flood risk management plans
(FRMP). The EA must produce FRMPs for river basin
districts, while LLFAs are legally obliged to produce plans
for flood risk areas to support the FRMP. Plans must
coincide with river basin management plans, the multi-
annual planning cycle established by the Water Framework
Directive and national FCERM objectives. The EA pro-
duced draft FRMPs (required under the Flood Risk Regu-
lations 2009) and draft updated river basin management
plans (required under the WFD) which were published for
coordinated consultation in 2014, partly to provide stake-
holders with opportunities to consider options for more
effective water management (EA 2015). In England, these
plans were published in late 2015, with subsequent reviews
to be completed by 2021 and at six yearly cycles thereafter.
Thirdly, the UK government has, since 2011, introduced
additional requirements for FCERM that map on to pre-
existing institutional structures while providing new roles
for agencies and local authorities. As discussed above,
Defra still assumes overall policy control, with the Envi-
ronment Agency retaining strategic operational responsi-
bility for implementing policy. However, the Environment
Agency must collaborate with other actors to manage flood
risks from ‘third-party assets’ with Lead Local Flood
Authorities, Internal Drainage Boards and water compa-
nies, each of which has specific management roles
(Table 2). A particularly important role is assigned under
the 2010 Act to LLFAs who are responsible for localised
flood risks from surface water, groundwater, smaller
watercourses and highway run-off but also for protecting
parts of the coastline. Management is supported by grant-
in-aid funding from central government, supplemented by
local authority match spending and local levies (Lorenzoni
et al. 2016). Coordination between central and local gov-
ernment is achieved via the Regional Flood and Coastal
Committees (RFCCs) (ibid.) and national policy require-
ments. The latter obligations require LLFAs to produce a
Local Flood Risk Management Strategy (LFRMS) cover-
ing flooding from localised sources that must be consistent
with the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Man-
agement Strategy, FRMPs and preliminary flood risk
assessments. Communities and other Risk Management
Authorities (RMAs) must be consulted in the development
of LFRMS. Other governance mechanisms used in LFRMS
development are catchment flood management plans
(CMPs), Shoreline Management Plans and Surface Water
Management Plans. First developed in the 2000s, CMPs
have been completed for 68 sub-regional catchments across
England and Wales, setting long-term (i.e. 50–100 year)
objectives for inland flood risk management and helping to
shape investment decision-making within river basin dis-
tricts. Complementary Shoreline Management Plans are
developed with local authorities and the EA to cover
coastline in England, based on individual ‘sediment cells’
Fig. 1 Institutional context of
IWRM/FCERM in England
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linked to distinct coastal processes. Surface Water Man-
agement Plans, meanwhile, are prepared by local authori-
ties for specific high-risk locations, in conjunction with
local stakeholders.
Finally, flood risk requirements for local land-use
planning are outlined in broader national planning policy.
General planning requirements were reformed by the
National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (Department
for Communities and Local Government 2012), which
aims to avoid and manage flood risks through local plan-
ning authority responsibilities for producing development
plans and determining planning applications. Under Sec-
tion 10, entitled ‘Meeting the challenge of climate change,
flooding and coastal change’, local planners are obliged to:
‘adopt proactive strategies to mitigate and adapt to
climate change, taking full account of flood risk,
coastal change and water supply and demand con-
siderations.’ (ibid.: 22)
The NPPF determines that development should be either
directed away from high-risk areas or made safe from flood
risks when deemed necessary, with Surface Water Man-
agement Plans the key mechanisms for this purpose. Under
the implementing instrument (PPS 25), local plans must
therefore be subject to Strategic Flood Risk Assessments,
using advice from the EA and LLFAs. Where risks are
identified, specific management policies must be included
in the plan. In addition, so-called Sequential3 and
Exception Tests should be applied to new developments to
reduce risks, while the long-term sustainability of schemes
under conditions of future climate change should be con-
sidered. Planners are also required to consider the viability
of new developments within Coastal Change Management
Areas, which cover areas deemed at risk from coastal
erosion and inundation. Other national-level flood risk
policy obligations on local planning stem from Building
Regulations, which were amended after the Pitt Review.
Part H of the Building Regulations now requires planning
permission for the paving of front gardens with imperme-
able material. Approval for sustainable urban drainage
systems (SUDS) that avoid connecting sewerage systems
with surface water run-off is also required for construction
with drainage implications. The Localism Act 2011 may
also prove significant for future flood risk management via
local planning. Communities will be encouraged to input
into local flood risk management strategies that will inform
neighbourhood planning. In response, organisations such as
Serve On, who provide disaster relief for flooding, and
community flood action groups are now providing more
‘bottom-up’ solutions (see Cook and Inman (2012) for a
discussion on the growth of this sector).
Applying the framework: coherence, incoherence,
de-coherence and re-coherence
In applying the evaluative framework (outlined in Table 1
earlier), different degrees of coherence are visible between
these institutional pillars: objectives; instruments; imple-
mentation; outputs. There is evident coherence between the
Water Framework Directive and Floods Directive ‘pillars’,
certainly in terms of higher-level objectives, instrument
calibration and implementing institutions (plans). Both
have policy objectives established at the EU level, with the
Floods Directive deliberately designed to integrate with the
WFD. Indeed, while the Floods Directive points out that
‘reducing the risks of floods is not one the principal
objectives of… [the Water Framework Directive]’ it ‘will
contribute to mitigating the effects of floods’ (Official
Journal of the European Communities 2007: 27). So while
the WFD is specifically aimed at achieving ‘good’ eco-
logical and chemical status of waters, and the Floods
Directive with reducing risks from flooding, these quali-
tative and quantitative aspects of water management are
intended to be integrated together through the common
obligation for river basin management planning. In this
respect, there is coherence again at the national level, in
terms of the national regulations (instruments) which
transpose both directives (i.e. The Water Environment
(Water Framework Directive) Regulations 2003 and Flood
Risk Regulations 2009). At the implementation level, in
Table 2 Statutory flood risk management responsibilities for specific
water resources assumed by different actors in England
Actor Water resources responsibilities
in flood risk management
Environment Agency Main rivers
Coastal waters
Reservoirs
Lead Local Flood Authorities Surface water
Groundwater
Ordinary watercourses
Highway run-off
Water companies Sewers and drains
Internal Drainage Boards (IDBs) Internal drainage districts
Transport agencies (Network Rail,
British Waterways, Highways
Agency)
Railway culverts
Canals
Motorway drainage
Landowners/riparian owners Individual watercourses
3 The Sequential Test aims to steer development to locations where
there is a low probability of flooding. An Exception Test can be used
to grant planning permission where developments show that they have
increased resilience to flooding and reduced residual risk to properties
and owners.
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England, the requirements for flood risk management plans
(institutions) at the time of writing are in the process of
completion, with consultation occurring on FRMPs to
ensure consistency with river basin management planning.
Outputs, in the form of management plan measures, should
in theory ensure a degree of coherence at the river basin
scale. Government guidance to RMAs on preparing plans
therefore requires inter-institutional coordination through
the inclusion of ‘information about… the implementation
of measures under the FRMP and river basin management
plans’ (GOV.UK 2014). An examination of draft FRMPs
and their attendant strategic environmental assessments
shows that regional plans and constituent catchment plans
do consider WFD objectives. But, critically, few flood risk
management plan measures are identified as contributing to
them, or their contribution is only broadly specified. For
example, in the South West catchment draft FRMP, only
nine of the 502 individual flood risk ‘actions’ detailed
across eleven catchments mention their contribution to
WFD objectives; the majority providing no specific details
or stating generally that they would work with ‘natural
processes’ to ensure water management objectives.
There appears to be some coherence between national-
level FCERM and the WFD, but problems are evident.
Most notably, objectives and instruments are set at differ-
ent institutional levels, with national FCERM approaches
contained in the Flood and Water Management Act 2010
and national policy. Lead Local Flood Authorities are
obliged to specify how their LFRMS ‘contributes to the
achievement of wider environmental objectives’ (Section 9
(4) (i)), although the WFD is not explicitly mentioned.
Local Government Authority (LGA) implementing guid-
ance does however state that Strategies should consider the
WFD in their development and that they ‘should be
assessed for WFD compliance to ensure that local mea-
sures to reduce flood risk comply with the WFD’ and
support its objectives (LGA 2011: 20). To an extent, there
is coherence with implementing institutions, with a
majority of LFRMS sampled for this research4 considering
WFD objectives in Strategy development, although not
necessarily providing specific links to river basin man-
agement plans. Most LLFAs also employed their Strategic
Environmental Assessments as inter-institutional coordi-
nating mechanisms to examine coherence with Strategy
measures ex post, but some assessments just note that WFD
plans were considered. It was therefore difficult to show
that outputs, in the form of LFRMS management measures,
provided consistency with WFD plan measures. That said,
LFRMS were generally supported by preliminary flood risk
assessments and hence were indirectly integrated with
Flood Risk Management Planning.
There also appears to be only limited coherence with the
WFD and land-use planning, with significant mismatches in
policy objectives, instruments, implementation and outputs.
Broader objectives for land-use planning are contained in
national legislation: specific objectives for flood risk man-
agement are set out in the NPPF, which provides general
obligations on local planning authorities for ensuring
development addresses flood risks but does not directly cite
coherence with EU objectives. The main policy instrument,
in this case PPS 25, also provides only marginal linkage with
the Water Framework Directive regulations. PPS 25 states
that regional spatial strategies (RSS) policies should be
consistent with river basin management planning. However,
implementation at the local level is through the production of
local spatial strategies and local plans, neither of which map
directly on to regional-scale river basin management plan-
ning. Strategic flood risk assessments of local plans do, to an
extent, provide a broad inter-institutional coordinating
mechanism with FRMP. Also, local plan policy develop-
ment must consider other relevant plan objectives, including
the WFD. But mismatches exist in terms of actual outputs, in
this case planning decisions. Mitigating measures for indi-
vidual developments such as SUDS can contribute to both
flood reduction and water quality objectives; yet, this does
not constitute a fully integrated approach.
This analysis consequently shows both patterns of coher-
ence and incoherence through time and institutional space.
Some aspects of flood risk management policy, in the form of
the Floods Directive implementation, do manifestly cohere
with the river basin management approach in terms of higher-
level objectives, instruments and plans, although actual
planning measures in the form of FRMPs are yet to be fully
aligned. Other aspects of policy, such as national FCERM and
land-use planning, appear less coherent due to evident scale
mismatches in objectives, instruments, implementation and
outputs. Despite the existence of inter-institutional coordi-
nating mechanisms (e.g. strategic environmental assess-
ments) and coordinating bodies (primarily the Environment
Agency, LLFAs, RFCCs), the approach to IWRM appears
less than fully ‘integrated’ in practice. Yet, this pattern of
partial coherence has arguably increased through time due to
institutional fragmentation, i.e. de-coherence. Most tasks for
water management, including flood management and main-
taining water quality, were concentrated in the Regional
Water Authorities in the 1970s. Consequently, England
actually had more integrated forms of water resources man-
agement 40 years ago, with the succession of policy changes
in the intervening years inducing multiple plans and a
patchwork of responsibilities. Policy analysts would recog-
nise this process as an example of path dependency, whereby
‘[o]nce a particular path gets established… self-reinforcing
4 A sample of 42 Local Flood Risk Management Strategies from
across England were analysed for their consistency with the WFD.
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processes make reversals very difficult’ (Pierson 2004: 10).
Whether this institutionally fragmentary evolution is leading
to more effective management of flood risks is a matter of
conjecture—recent flood events in northern England in
December 2015 may infer that it is not.
To an extent, this pattern could be anticipated, given the
long history of institutional fragmentation that has occurred
since the 1970s. The UK Government National Audit
Office (2011) hence questioned the compatibility of dif-
ferent planning elements of FCERM, introduced under the
National Strategy, stating that:
‘We have identified 19 individual policy and plan-
ning documents that sit behind these plans. […]
There is considerable overlap in these plans and local
decision-making is hampered by having to cross-refer
to different national content’ (p.28)
While the NAO (2011) argues that Local Flood Risk
Management Strategies should ‘eliminate the need to refer
to the underlying plans’ (ibid.), the impression given from
our analysis is that they have not necessarily led to greater
clarity.
This observation raises questions over how coherence
could be pursued in the future, to promote the greater
integration of IWRM in England, i.e. re-coherence. One
approach could be to base all aspects of water and land
management at the river basin scale, via integrated spatial
planning. Here, objectives for water quality and flood
management could be reconciled through a rationalisation
of plans, with river basin and catchment-scale planning
being the most obvious mechanism for alignment. There is
some scope to further integrate national FCERM with river
basin planning via LFRMS, although it would require the
greater participation of Lead Local Flood Authorities in
this process, given their responsibilities for localised risk
management. The Regional Flood and Coastal Committees
(RFCCs) could provide an important coordinating mecha-
nism between these authorities and regional planning in the
future. However, it is perhaps more problematic in this
context to entirely integrate local land-use planning, which
often occurs at different scales and under parallel but often
competing national policy objectives. Other actors such as
IDBs and water companies also have different management
objectives, the former concerned with managing flood risk
and land drainage together, the latter with ensuring sew-
erage and water supply.
Conclusions
Integrated water resources management aims at coherence
between different aspects of water management at the
regional, river basin scale. Yet, evidence from IWRM
approaches globally suggests that it is less coherent in
practice. By examining policy requirements in England for
river basin management planning under the WFD and other
policy ‘pillars’ for flood risk management, there are indeed
different degrees of coherence with policy objectives.
Alignment with the requirements for flood risk assessment
and mapping under the Floods Directive is relatively high,
although actual measures are seemingly yet to be coordi-
nated fully. This situation could be anticipated given that
objectives and targets, set at the European level, are
designed to be compatible at the regional scale. Yet, given
the complexity of flood risk management in England, with
parallel national policy objectives for FCERM and land-
use planning, other policy ‘pillars’ exhibit at best partial
coherence, at worst incoherence. Local Flood Risk Man-
agement Strategies could provide better fit with regional
planning, but mechanisms for achieving coherence are not
yet fully developed. Land-use planning requirements for
managing flood risks show similar degrees of incoherence.
One aspect not examined in this paper is the effectiveness
of policy outcomes; hence, further research could reflect on
whether incoherence is adversely impacting floods
governance.
This observation hints at the prospects for ‘lesson-
drawing’ (Benson and Jordan 2011) on policy responses for
England from other countries worldwide—if coherence is
considered a normative aim. While an obvious recom-
mendation for re-coherence would be that greater align-
ment of national FCERM and land-use policy with IWRM
in river basin planning would be optimal, there are
nonetheless institutional constraints in England. Spatial
planning, whereby all aspects of local water-use and land-
use management are considered together at a regional or
river basin scale, is a normative ideal. Experiences from
countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands could
prove instructive (Smith et al. 2015; Cook 2016). But in
England, local government land-use planning prerogatives
constrain this solution due to mismatches in the scale of
objectives. Yet, greater alignment of FCERM is possible if
greater ‘cross-compliance’ between competing objectives
can be achieved with river basin planning, thereby fulfilling
a central criteria of integrated water resources manage-
ment. Regional-scale institutional mechanisms such as the
RFCCs potentially provide one such coordinating
approach, as the institutional landscape in England con-
tinues evolving (i.e. new legislation such as the Water Act
2014, changing the structure of the Environment Agency)
with provisions relating to flood and coastal erosion risk
management.
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